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Abstract. We demonstrate that the principle of maximum relative entropy (ME), used judiciously,
can ease the specification of priors in model selection problems. The resulting effect is that models
that make sharp predictions are disfavoured, weakening the usual Bayesian “Occam’s Razor”.
This is illustrated with a simple example involving what Jaynes called a “sure thing” hypothesis.
Jaynes’ resolution of the situation involved introducing a large number of alternative “sure thing”
hypotheses that were possible before we observed the data. However, in more complex situations,
it may not be possible to explicitly enumerate large numbers of alternatives. The entropic priors
formalism produces the desired result without modifying the hypothesis space or requiring explicit
enumeration of alternatives; all that is required is a good model for the prior predictive distribution
for the data. This idea is illustrated with a simple rigged-lottery example, and we outline how this
idea may help to resolve a recent debate amongst cosmologists: is dark energy a cosmological
constant, or has it evolved with time in some way? And how shall we decide, when the data are in?
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1. INTRODUCTION
In Bayesian model selection, we have two or more competing hypotheses, H1 and
H2, with each possibly containing different parameters θ1 and θ2. We wish to judge
the plausibility of these two hypotheses in the light of some data D, and some prior
information I, dropped hereafter for succinctness. Bayes’ rule provides the means to
update our plausibilities of these two models, to take into account the data D:
P(H2|D)
P(H1|D)
=
P(H2)
P(H1)
P(D|H2)
P(D|H1)
=
P(H2)
P(H1)
×
∫
p(θ1|H1)p(D|θ1,H1)dθ1∫
p(θ2|H2)p(D|θ2,H2)dθ2
(1)
Thus, the ratio of the posterior probabilities for the two models is the prior odds ratio
times the evidence ratio.
If the various probabilities on the right-hand side of Equation 1 are a good description
of our prior beliefs, then the posterior probabilities will encode justified conclusions
based on the data. However, practical use of Equation 1 is often regarded with scepticism
[5, 9, 10]. This is primarily because the probabilities on the right-hand side are difficult
to specify without making ad hoc choices.
For reasons that are mostly historical, the prior distributions p(θ1|H1) and p(θ2|H2)
for the parameters of each model are usually considered the most troubling. The prior
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model probabilities are often set to 1/2, citing symmetry, and the sampling distributions
are usually considered uncontroversial. However, in many real scientific applications,
assigning priors is trivial compared to the job of assigning sampling distributions (Hogg,
priv comm); i.e. modelling how the question of interest would affect our data.
While many Bayesians would assert that the dependence on subjective judgments
exists because the result should actually depend on these judgments, it seems as though
there ought to be ways to reduce the subjective influences in the prior probabilities and
sampling distributions, even if they can never be entirely eliminated. In fact, this is the
entire reason for using Bayes’ rule in the first place [11]. Rather than simply looking at
the data and then assigning a posterior distribution directly, we make use of one objective
thing we actually know, Bayes’ rule. In this paper, we discuss how the principle of
maximum relative entropy (ME) [3] can be used to further reduce, though not eliminate,
the subjectivity of Bayesian inferences. The key requirement of this approach is that we
must have a realistic probabilistic model of our prior beliefs about the data, i.e. our prior
predictive distribution for the data must be modelled carefully.
1.1. Publishing the Evidence
Skilling [16] recommends that whenever some data is analysed using a model M1, the
evidence Z1 = p(D|M1)=
∫
p(θ1)p(D|θ1)dθ1 be presented. This way, anyone proposing
a different model M2 can calculate their own evidence Z2 and carry out model compari-
son with Equation 1 without the need to recalculate Z1, which was published by the first
author. This is good advice that has been taken by many in the astronomical community
[17, 18], however, it is not the whole story. The plausibility of a model does not depend
only on the evidence, it also depends on the prior probability (Equation 1). A large evi-
dence ratio can easily be cancelled by a tiny prior probability ratio and vice versa. The
sure thing problem, discussed in Section 2, is simple and well-known example of this
fact.
2. A SURE THING PROBLEM
Suppose a simple lottery is held, with tickets numbered from 1 to 1,000,000. Each ticket
is sold to a different person. Consider a hypothesis H1, which states that the lottery is
fair, and thus the probability of any particular ticket winning is 10−6. The draw is carried
out, producing the following data D: The winner of the lottery was ticket #263878. Alice
publishes a paper that reports this data, and proposes the fair lottery model H1 to explain
it. She presents the evidence Z1 = P(D|H1) = 10−6.
Bob, a professional rival of Alice, reads her paper and proposes a different model, H2:
The lottery was not fair. It was rigged in order to make ticket #263878 the winner. Bob
writes a paper presenting the evidence Z2 = P(D|H2) = 1. Thus, he concludes, if H1 and
H2 are initially equally plausible, the data makes H2 a million times more plausible than
H1. Clearly, something is not quite right with this conclusion.
2.1. Jaynes’ Solution: Introduce extra hypotheses
Jaynes [6] resolves the sure thing paradox in the following way. When Bob does a
model selection between H1 and H2 with P(H1) = P(H2) = 12 , he is implicitly stating
that before getting the data, he would have predicted ticket #263878 with a probability
greater than 50 %. Clearly, there is no way he could have known this before seeing
the data. Actually, before observing the data, there were 999,999 other “sure thing”
hypotheses that were on an equal footing with H2. The correct analysis would involve
a bigger hypothesis space containing 1,000,001 hypotheses: H1, and the 1,000,000 sure
thing hypotheses {S1,S2, ...,S1,000,000}, where S263878 ≡ H2. Bob should have assigned
1/2 of the prior probability to H1 and divided the other 1/2 evenly amongst the S’s. Then,
the prior probability of H2 is 5× 10−7 and its posterior probability is 1/2. This is the
correct result; knowledge of the winning ticket number does not affect the plausibility
of foul play. This argument resolves the sure thing problem by introducing a large
number of alternatives into the hypothesis space, thus drastically reducing the prior
probability of the particular sure thing hypothesis selected by the data. However, it is
difficult to generalise this reasoning into more complicated scenarios where the principle
of indifference cannot be used.
Before the lottery was drawn, Bob would have assigned a uniform predictive distri-
bution for the data. His reanalysis ought to reflect this, if not by introducing extra sure
thing models, then by downweighting H2 somehow to reduce the spike it produces in
the predictive distribution. While this is not the explicit motivation for entropic priors, it
is a pleasant side effect, as we will show in the next section.
3. ENTROPIC PRIORS
In this section we introduce the notion of an entropic prior [4, 14]. Usually, Bayesian
Inference is concerned with describing our knowledge in two stages: before taking into
account the data, and then after taking into account the data. Bayes’ rule is used to do
this updating. Before taking into account the data, there is a prior distribution p1(θ) and
sampling distributions p1(D|θ) for all D and θ . The reason for the subscript ‘1’ will
become clear later. By the product rule, this is equivalent to defining a joint prior on the
product space of possible hypotheses and possible data:
p1(θ ,D) = p1(θ)p1(D|θ) (2)
Here, the usual prior p1(θ) (actually a marginal distribution) describes prior knowledge
about θ , and the sampling distributions p1(D|θ) describe prior knowledge about how θ
is related to the data D that we plan to observe. The key point here is that before learning
the data, we are uncertain both about the parameters and about the data: p1(θ ,D) should
model this state of uncertainty.
In this paper, we will be concerned with describing uncertain knowledge about (θ ,D),
so we will be using probability distributions on the product space. We will start from a
joint prior p0(θ ,D) and update this distribution twice to obtain the final joint posterior.
We thus describe knowledge at three stages, defined below.
• Stage 0: Before we observe the data, or even know what sampling distributions
are. However, the parameter space and the data space have been defined, as well as
priors over these spaces. At stage 0, our knowledge is p0(θ ,D).
• Stage 1: Also before we observe the data. However, we have now specified the
sampling distributions p(D|θ) for all θ and D. At stage 1, our knowledge is
p1(θ ,D).
• Stage 2: We now have the data. Our knowledge is p2(θ ,D).
Updating from Stage 1 to Stage 2 is what we typically think of as Bayesian analysis.
We prefer updating, rather than just writing down Stage 2 probabilities, because we get
to use an objective updating rule, Bayes’ rule. The idea behind entropic priors is to
split up the process of assigning Stage 1 probabilities into two steps: Assigning Stage
0 probabilities, and then updating to Stage 1 using another objective updating rule, ME
[3]. There is a lot of confusion in the literature about the relationship between these
two principles. However, there need not be any tension between them if it is understood
that Bayes’ rule is to be used when we learn about propositions built from those in the
product space, such as ‘D = 42’ or ‘θ +D ≤ 1’, whereas ME applies to propositions
about probability distributions on that space2, such as ‘p(θ ,D) should be a Gaussian’.
3.1. Updating from Stage 0 to Stage 1
Say we have a Stage 0 joint prior, and we don’t know the sampling distributions yet.
Perhaps we haven’t calibrated the instruments to see what kinds of output they typically
produce. At this point our knowledge of (θ ,D) will often be independent, such that
taking data before learning about the experiment does not tell us anything about the pa-
rameters (it does tell us the data - and is therefore significant information in the product
space. However, data is usually a nuisance parameter[!]). However, for generality we
will allow dependence in the stage 0 distribution: p0(θ ,D) = p0(θ)p0(D|θ).
We then learn information in the form of a constraint on allowable joint probabil-
ity distributions: the sampling distributions p(D|θ) for all θ and D are given to us:
p(D|θ) = f (D;θ), where f is a given function. We must adjust our joint distribution so
that this constraint is satisfied. By the rules of probability any distribution of the form
p1(θ ,D) = p1(θ) f (D;θ) is allowed, and we have absolute freedom to vary p1(θ) while
still satisfying the constraint on the sampling distributions. However, there is a best
choice for p1(θ) [3]: p1(θ) should be chosen such that p1(θ ,D) is as close as possible
to p0(θ ,D), i.e. we choose the p1(θ) that maximises the relative entropy
S =−
∫ ∫
p1(θ ,D) log
(
p1(θ ,D)
p0(θ ,D)
)
dθ dD (3)
2 This raises a philosophical point, as most information is ultimately in the form of data. However, we
may summarise the resultant effect of a large amount of external data as providing a constraint on our
probability distributions.
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FIGURE 1. The basic idea behind entropic priors. An initially independent N(0,1) joint prior for two
quantities x and y (to be thought of as “parameters” and “data” respectively) is updated once the sampling
distributions p(y|x)∀y,x are known to be p(y|x)∼N(x,1). When the data are known (in this case, y= 0.5),
the joint distribution is updated again. This second updating is equivalent to the usual Bayesian process.
=−
∫ ∫
p1(θ)p1(D|θ) log
(
p1(θ)p1(D|θ)
p0(θ)p0(D|θ)
)
dθ dD (4)
Differentiating with respect to each value of p1(θ) (i.e. its value at each θ ) and setting
to zero (with Lagrange multiplier term added):
∂
∂ p1(θ)
(
S−λ
(∫
p1(θ)dθ −1
))
= 0 (5)
Carrying out this calculation gives:
p1(θ) ∝ p0(θ)eS(D|θ ) (6)
where
S(D|θ) =−
∫
p1(D|θ) log
(
p1(D|θ)
p0(D|θ)
)
dD (7)
Thus, the marginal for θ after learning the sampling distributions, p1(D|θ), is propor-
tional to the original marginal p0(θ), but multiplied by the exponential of the entropy of
the corresponding sampling distribution relative to p0(D|θ) (usually just p0(D)). This
process of updating from stage 0 to stage 1 using ME, and subsequently updating using
data, is illustrated graphically in Figure 1.
Applying similar logic to model selection problems consists simply of applying the
short-cut reasoning of the above paragraph: each hypothesis (model and its parameter
value) gets its prior probability rescaled by a factor measuring the closeness of its
predictions to our initial predictions. This makes it clear that invoking symmetry to
assign P(H1) = P(H2) = 12 is flawed: the symmetry may be broken as soon as we assign
the sampling distributions.
4. SURE THING PROBLEM: ENTROPIC PRIORS SOLUTION
For the lottery problem, our knowledge about the data before getting it, and before
the two models have been specified, is described by a uniform distribution over the
integers from 1 to 106: p0(D) = 10−6 for all D3. Because the two models haven’t
been specified yet, symmetry implies we must assign equal prior (marginal stage 0)
probabilities p0(H1) = p0(H2) = 12 . The joint probabilities for the hypothesis and the
data are therefore uniform and independent.
The next step is to incorporate more information and update our probabilities to stage
1. This information is not the data, but the specification of the sampling distributions:
p(D|H1) = 10−6 for all D, and p(D|H2) = 1 if D = 263878 and zero otherwise. As
explained in Section 3, the priors for the two hypotheses should be reweighted according
to the exponential of the entropy of their sampling distributions with respect to the
original predictive distribution. These entropies are
S(D|H1) =−
106
∑
i=1
10−6 log 10
−6
10−6
= 0 (8)
S(D|H2) =−1log
1
10−6
= log(10−6) (9)
(10)
Thus, the solution to the lottery problem is:
p(H2|D)
p(H1|D)
=
(
1
2
1
2
)
×
(
10−6
1
)
×
(
1
10−6
)
= 1 (11)
The three factors here are the Stage 0 odds ratio, the entropic correction factor, and
the evidence ratio. The resulting conclusion is as it should be: knowing the winning
lottery number provides no information about whether there is fraud or not. Usually,
models that make sharp, correct predictions are favoured by Bayesian inference. In this
example, this still occurs in the evidence ratio, but the entropic factor also penalizes
H2 by the same amount for being unjustifiably confident compared to our honest prior
predictive distribution p0(D).
5. EVOLVING DARK ENERGY
The nature of dark energy, thought to be responsible for causing the observed late-
time accelerated expansion of the Universe [12, 13], is a key driver of many upcoming
cosmological surveys and instruments [1]. From a model selection point of view, one
3 This could be different if we tried to incorporate psychological theories as to which numbers would be
more likely under the cheating scenario - perhaps ‘123456’ would have its probability boosted - but we
will ignore this effect here.
of the key questions is whether the equation of state of dark energy, w, is exactly equal
to minus one for all time or whether it has any temporal variation. The former case is
equivalent to Einstein’s cosmological constant, or non-zero vacuum energy, while any
variation from this value, however small, indicates very different physics at play, such
as the existence of a primordial scalar field, or other even more exotic possibilities [2].
Here, model selection is really the key goal; the exact form of any evolution of w is less
interesting than simply being sure that it does evolve, or at least have a value different
from the cosmological constant. There has been vigorous debate in the literature on how
to best answer this question [5, 9, 10]. Here we outline the contribution entropic priors
can make to this debate; detailed analysis will be presented in a future contribution.
We will consider four different models for how the dark energy equation of state has
varied throughout the universe’s history. Typically this is described as w varying as a
function of a, the scale factor.
H0: Cosmological Constant Λ: w(a) =−1
H1: Constant, but non-Λ: w(a) = w0
H2: Simple Evolving: w(a) = w0 +(1−a)wa
H3: Complex Evolving: w(a) = Some model with many parameters
Observations of type Ia supernovae, particularly how their apparent brightness decreases
with redshift, is a strong probe of w [8, 15]. The idea is to test the four models, given such
data [5], and to forecast the informativeness of proposed future missions [1]. However,
not all of the models are physically well-motivated: e.g. H0 arises naturally from General
Relativity, H1 and H2 are ad hoc “simple models”, and H3 expresses gross ignorance.
Therefore, while it is fair to assign a large probability to H0 at Stage 1, it does not
automatically make sense to share the remaining probability evenly amongst H1-H3. The
reason for this is that H1, H2 and H3 may imply quite different predictive distributions
for the data. If we build a p0(D) that we trust, then the simple models H1 and H2 may
be downgraded in prior probability solely because they make predictions that are too
confident4. Of course, if, in the course of building p0(D), we explicitly think about the
predictions of the H’s, then this will not occur - entropic priors do not magically generate
information. What they do is implore us to think about p(D) when assigning priors, a
key sanity check that is often overlooked.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Bayesian model selection is a difficult task, both computationally and philosophically.
If we are not careful, we can obtain misleading results. The idea presented in this paper,
of assigning a realistic predictive distribution for the data and then penalizing models
whose predictions differ from it, should assist in making Bayesian model selection
analyses more reliable.
4 The chance that an unknown function just happens to be a straight line is usually quite small, unless you
have very good prior reasons to expect a straight line.
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